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Despite a historic fall in spending, last week’s budget deal
will help to increase the EU’s effectiveness.
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At last week’s European Council summit, the EU’s leaders agreed to a real terms spending
cut to the EU budget for the first time. Despite this, Patrick Diamond and Renaud Thillaye
argue that not only could the overall amount of money spent at EU level be higher in the
next seven years, but that a great deal will also depend on the national actors’ capacity to
draw on co-financing opportunities. Far from being a disaster for the European centre-left,
this budget contains some important aspects, such as the Youth Unemployment Initiative.
Last week’s EU budget agreement generated many headlines, not least because f or the
f irst t ime in the history of  the EU, spending is set to f all in real terms. The cut of  €34.4
billion (£29 billion) between now and 2019 f rom the ongoing 2007-2013 f inancial
f ramework has been seen in the UK as a polit ical triumph f or the Brit ish Conservative
Prime Minister, David Cameron. Much of  this speculation misunderstands the true
signif icance of  the budget deal, however.
For one, it is not the aggregate levels of  expenditure which the budget specif ies that is
the issue, but how ef f ectively the money is spent by member states. As François Hollande acknowledged
on Friday, the greater f lexibility allowed f or the use of  remaining credits each year means that the level of
actual expenditure might well be higher in the next seven years than during the last seven. The extent to
which member states will benef it f rom programmes such as the EU structural f unds relates to their own
capacity to draw on ‘co-f inancing’ opportunit ies. Moreover, the signif icance of  the budget ought to be
analysed and assessed according to more meaningf ul criteria: not only how well the settlement will
enable Europe to f unction in the f oreseeable f uture, but the extent to which the agreement will provide
members states and the EU with an exit strategy f rom the present crisis.
The 2013 budget deal was by no means a disaster, not least
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The 2013 budget deal was by no means a disaster, not least
by comparison with the 2007-13 f ramework. For those
seriously committed to ref orm of  the EU in order to stem the
decline in public trust and to increase Europe’s ef f ectiveness,
there are important init iatives. The f all in direct payments
under the Common Agricultural Policy and the decision to
direct more f unds to poorer f armers in Central and Eastern
Europe is particularly welcome, as is the commitment to
environmental conditionality.
The budget agreement also strengthens the macroeconomic
conditionality regime in the EU, restricting the f low of  credit to
those member states who are in an ‘excessive def icit ’ or
‘excessive imbalance’ situations, and who are not abiding by
their budgetary and ref orm commitments. This is a potentially
powerf ul instrument to incentivise ref orm, although the
punitive logic ought to be balanced by additional f unding if
governments perf orm well. This idea of  ‘convergence and
competit iveness contracts’ between the Commission and
member states on a voluntary basis will be on the agenda f or
EU leaders meeting later this year.
Of  course, the proposal init ially tabled by the Commission was
more radical in key respects, and it might have been pref erable
to f ollow the Commission’s lead. For instance, the Connecting
Europe Facility to strength the EU’s transport, broadband and energy networks was init ially budgeted
with €40 billion, a f igure brought down to €29 billion. This still represents a double-digit increase f rom
2007-2013, but the roll-out of  f ast broadband takes the biggest hit (down f rom €9 to €1 billion).
The f undamental question raised by the budget settlement is how f ar it underpins the Europe 2020
Strategy and in so doing, of f ers a tenable exit strategy f or Europe out of  the 2008-09 crisis. The 2020
Strategy ought not to be too easily dismissed. Although it was agreed by a group of  mainly centre-right
governments, it is strikingly social and environment- f riendly, and providing an important statement of
ref orming intent. Narratives and the language of  ref orm matter in enabling polit icians to f rame init iatives
that will be more readily accepted by voters. Europe needs a story line which sets out a long term
trajectory of  ref orm.
The 2020 objectives are demanding: 3 per cent of  GDP must be invested in research and innovation.
There must 20 per cent less energy consumption, 20 per cent lower greenhouse gas emissions, and the
share of  renewable energies must reach 20 per cent. 75 per cent of  20 to 64 year olds must be in
employment. 40 per cent of  30 to 34 year olds must have completed tertiary education. And there must be
20 million f ewer EU cit izens living in poverty and social exclusion.
Analysing the impact of  last week’s budget deal against these targets is dif f icult, as the alignment
between the budget’s commitments and the 2020 objectives is neither clear nor transparent. The good
news is that the research and innovation budget will increase f rom €55 to 71 billion in the next seven
years (although the Commission tabled €80 billion), providing a much needed boost to European
competit iveness. The decision to slash the Globalisation Adjustment Fund, in contrast, sends mixed
signals about European solidarity in achieving the employment targets set out in the Europe 2020
strategy.
However, an important development is the allocation of  €6 billion to a Youth Unemployment Init iative.
This was a longstanding claim of  the centre- lef t, who recently succeeded in passing a resolution in the
European Parliament urging member states to put ‘youth guarantees’ in place. Again, a lot will depend on
how f ar national governments seize the opportunit ies created by this budget agreement, aligning their
spending priorit ies with those of  the EU. In this regard, the Commission has been correct to identif y
‘modernising public administration’ as a key priority in the last two Annual Growth Surveys.
So we should certainly not be distracted by the side show of  David Cameron’s storytelling. The European
Parliament’s President Martin Schulz has announced that MEPs would probably hold a secret ballot on
the deal at some point in March. This would make the f inancial f ramework’s adoption dif f icult since MEPs
would be under less pressure f rom their home government. Whatever the headlines that greeted last
week’s deal, now more than ever the EU needs a clear strategy linking budget commitments with long-
term social and economic goals.
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1. Member states will inevitably reach a compromise on the EU budget, but there is lit t le chance of
necessary ref orms being carried out. (10.8)
2. The EU budget process encourages deadlock and makes large ref orms almost impossible. The
best that ref ormers can hope f or is gradual change. (8.9)
3. The UK will gain very litt le f rom blocking a deal on the EU budget. (13.9)
